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Abstract
Abstract: During the past two decades, Alvin Plantinga has formulated an argument against naturalism that
focuses on naturalism’s acceptance of contemporary evolutionary theory. Plantinga argues that given
naturalism and evolution, our cognitive faculties have been developed to produce beliefs that meet the
Darwinian requirement of survival and reproduction. Plantinga argues that accepting this will lead a naturalist
to have a defeater for all of their beliefs, including their belief in naturalism. In this paper, I survey and respond
to two types of objections that have been given as a response to Plantinga’s argument. The first objection that I
interact with is an objection given by Michael Bergmann. Bergmann argues that a naturalist can continue to
hold on to both their naturalism and their belief that their faculties are reliable, even if the probability of their
faculties being reliable is low. The second objection that I interact with is an objection that can be seen in the
work of Jerry Fodor and Stephen Law. This objection argues that beliefs that enable survival and reproduction
will likely be truth conducive and thus, the chance of having reliable faculties is high. I respond to this
argument by first reiterating Plantinga’s traditional response to this objection. After I clarify and defend this
traditional response, I then reformulate Plantinga’s argument to specifically address metaphysical beliefs. Not
only does this give the non-naturalist two different responses to this objection, but I take it that the
reformulation could be seen as even more persuasive than the traditional formulation.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After developing his theory of warrant in Warrant and Proper Function, 
Alvin Plantinga argues that if one takes both the tenets of naturalism and 
evolution, one has a defeater for all of their beliefs, including their belief in 
naturalism. In 2002, James Beilby edited a volume entitled Naturalism Defeated?: 
Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. In this volume 
Plantinga briefly reiterates his evolutionary argument against naturalism and then 
allows several high caliber epistemologists, metaphysicians, and philosophers of 
science to respond to the argument. The volume ends with Plantinga addressing 
each critique as he argues that his argument is “bloodied but unbowed.”1 
Through the work of Plantinga and my own contributions, in this paper I will first 
attempt to defend Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against a unique objection 
from Michael Bergmann and then an objection that is shared by William Ramsey, 
Jerry Fodor, and Stephen Law. Stephen Law’s specific formulation of the latter 
objection will lead me to reformulate Alvin Plantinga’s argument by only addressing 
metaphysical beliefs (and more specifically, beliefs in naturalism and theism). 
Though before I begin this endeavor, I will first need to reiterate and identify what 
Plantinga has in mind by naturalism.  
 
NATURALISM 
 
There are many variations of what one can mean by naturalism. There is a 
naturalism that one might invoke in an epistemological context when discussing 
what types of things one can know.2 To this type of naturalism, W.V. Quine states, 
“It is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be 
identified and described.”3 Similarly, Devitt notes, “There is only one way of 
knowing: the empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever that may be).”4  
There is also a methodological understanding of naturalism that is in regard to 
certain methodological assumptions to what guides or constrains the process of 
inquiry.5 In order to help make this clearer, Michael Rea quotes Leiter, “Naturalism 
in philosophy is always first a methodological view to the effect that philosophical 
theorizing should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences.”6 
                                                 
1 Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 205. 
2 I was initially made aware of the following definitions in Michael Rea’s work, World 
Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism.   
3 W.V. Quine. Theories of Things (Harvard University Press, 1981), 21.  
4 Michael Devitt. Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism 
(Cambridge Press 1996), 2.  
5 Michael Rea. World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002), 64. 
6 Ibid. 
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These epistemological and methodological definitions would be distinct from 
a metaphysical view of naturalism which according to Armstrong is “a spatio-
temporal account of the general nature of reality.”7 Similarly, Stace argues 
“…naturalism [is] the belief that the world is a single system of things or events 
every one of which is bound to every other in a network of relations and laws, 
and…outside this ‘natural order’ there is nothing.”8 The last two definitions appear 
to be more in line with what Plantinga is arguing against.   
Given that all of reality (that in which exists inside the natural order) is 
governed by the laws of nature, there wouldn’t seem to be any room for something 
like an immaterial soul. Naturalism would seemingly force one into one of the three 
following options: one can deny human consciousness, reduce it to the physical, or 
allow for the possibility of supervenience. Plantinga’s argument is an argument that 
can be successful regardless of which one of these options a naturalist takes. Having 
now established what I mean by naturalism I will now precede to Plantinga’s 
formulation of the argument.  
 
PLANTINGA’S EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALISM (EAAN) 
 
Let P stand for probability of, let R stand for the proposition that our 
cognitive faculties are reliable, and let N and E stand for naturalism and evolution.9 
 
(1) P(R/N&E) is low  
(2) Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that P(R/N&E) is low has a 
defeater for R 
(3) Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other belief she 
thinks she has, including [belief in] N&E itself 
(4) If one who accepts N&E thereby acquires a defeater for N&E, N&E is 
self-defeating and cannot rationally be accepted.10  
 
I will first address the less controversial (2), and then I will address the all-
important (1). Regarding (2), one might wonder why one could not just have the 
reliability of one’s cognitive faculties as a basic belief. Perhaps it would appear 
given N&E that the chances of our faculties producing mostly true beliefs would be 
low, but given the strong intuition that our faculties are reliable to some degree, one 
                                                 
7 David Armstrong, Postscript: “Naturalism, Materialism, and First Philosophy 
Reconsidered,” in Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, edited by Paul Moser and J. D. Trout 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 48. 
              8 Walter T. Stace. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association   
Vol. 23, 1949-1950, 22. 
 9 In regard to ‘R’, the definition that I have in mind also includes the beliefs that are 
produced from them in both basic and based ways. 
10 Alvin Plantinga. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 344-345. 
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could be warranted in affirming R in a basic way. Michael Bergmann argues for this 
as he states the following: 
But the commonsense naturalist can respond as follows: “Even if a naturalist 
believed that P(R/N&E) is low or inscrutable, this needn’t give her a defeater for R. 
For she could have nonpropositional evidence for R that is sufficiently strong to 
make belief in R rational, reasonable, and warranted-even for someone whose total 
relevant propositional evidence, k, was such that P(R/k) is low or inscrutable.11 
How would Plantinga respond to such an argument? In order to respond to 
this objection, it would be helpful to first note that though one could acquire a belief 
in a basic way (as Bergmann of course knows), it doesn’t follow that it would be 
immune to defeaters. There are a plethora of examples of how one could get a 
defeater for a basic belief. These sorts of beliefs would include beliefs like, ‘In 1492 
Columbus sailed the ocean blue,’ ‘Obama won the majority of delegates in the 2008 
election,’ and the names of peoples, places, and things. Focusing on the last of these 
examples, let us take the belief that is formed when discovering a person’s name by 
testimony. Perhaps a fellow student introduces his first name as being Luke and, 
without any argument, I just find myself believing that his name is Luke. It would 
seem that, if I am without a defeater and his name really is Luke, then I would 
have knowledge and be warranted in believing that his first name was Luke. 
However, if I found a list of the students in the class and I discovered that his first 
name was not Luke but in fact Jerry, I would no longer be rational in believing that 
his first name is Luke.  
 Take another example – perhaps an example of a basic belief that was 
derived from perception: I look out of my backyard where there happens to be a 
large pond and I see what I believe to be a beautiful swan. I see the swan moving as 
swans normally move; visually, from my distance, it looks how swans normally look. 
However, upon closer investigation, I discover that the swan was in fact a well-
designed replica of a swan. If this were so, I would then have a defeater for the basic 
belief that was formed by my perception.  
This is what I think Plantinga is trying to get across; namely, if one has a 
basic belief that one’s cognitive faculties are reliable, but then reflects on the truths 
of N&E and comes to the conclusion that there is an undercutting defeater for all of 
their beliefs, one would then be irrational if one continued to hold that these 
cognitive faculties were reliable.12 Now, one would indeed, have to be convinced that 
the chances of R is low, that is low enough that it significantly decreases one’s 
warrant for believing in R. But given this is the case; one would have a defeater for 
their basic belief in R, and thus would be irrational in continuing to hold onto their 
belief in R and N&E. It thus seems to me that what Bergmann has shown is that 
                                                 
11 Michael Bergmann, “Common Sense Naturalism,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, edited by James Beilby(Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002),  68. 
12 By undercutting defeater, I have in mind a defeater that doesn’t directly demonstrate that 
something is false; rather, the defeater demonstrates that one is in such an epistemic situation, 
where one lacks warrant for believing that p. 
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this argument might be person variable. Some individuals might be affected by this 
argument in such a way that their warrant is significantly decreased, even given 
non-propositional evidence. Others however (Bergmann?), might not be moved 
much by this argument given that one holds to non-propositional evidence with 
extreme firmness. Given this is the case; it would appear that besides (1), the rest of 
the argument seems to follow without much controversy. The plausibility of the 
argument rests on (1) being plausible. If, indeed, (1) can be demonstrated to be more 
plausible than its negation, it would appear that Plantinga’s initial argument is a 
good one.  
 
A REFORMATIONAL VIEW ON PAUL 
 
In arguing for (1) being plausible, I will now defend Plantinga’s evolutionary 
argument against naturalism and then further it by applying it to strictly 
metaphysical beliefs.13 In Plantinga’s past works, he has made the following points; 
in an orthodox Darwinian framework, man’s cognitive faculties produce beliefs that 
are not aimed directly at truth; rather, they are aimed at producing survival and 
reproductive behavior. The beliefs produced by a non-theistic Darwinian framework 
are beliefs produced to give the correct inputs that lead to the correct survival 
outputs. As Patricia Churchland puts it: 
Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed 
in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principal chore of 
nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the 
organism may survive... Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an 
evolutionary advantage: A fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it 
is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of 
survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.14 
In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga gives an example of how 
advantageous beliefs produced by natural selection can be causally linked with 
survival and reproduction but also be beliefs that are not aimed at truth. The 
scenario goes as follows: 
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a 
tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the 
tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as 
survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief. ... Or perhaps 
he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he 
                                                 
13 Though for the most part I will be defending Plantinga’s traditional version of the 
argument, I will not argue that given N&E, R is low, rather I will argue that given N&E, R is 
inscrutable.  
14 Patricia Churchland, Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience. Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 
84. 1987, 548-49. 
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also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it. ... Clearly there are 
any number of belief-cum-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.15 
The sophomore biology major might see this example and object, saying that, 
in order for Paul to have a fighting chance at getting away from the tiger, he would 
have to get his adrenaline pumping through his body. Wanting to pet a ‘nice ole 
pussycat’ or perhaps being manically depressed and wanting to get eaten by a 
bigger one, would simply not do the trick.16 Thus, Plantinga's example fails to show 
how Paul might have a belief that would both aid him in surviving as well as be a 
belief that didn’t correspond with the external reality.  
The most common claims against Plantinga's argument, and possibly the 
most striking attempted defeaters heaved at Plantinga's seemingly arrogant claim, 
are those given by Jerry Fodor, Evan Fales, and Stephen Law. Their objections all 
center on the fact that natural selection would in fact choose mostly true beliefs, as 
true beliefs would be what are needed to give the greatest chance of survival. 
Though Stephen Law’s main point is somewhat different than Fodor and Fales,17 
and though Law has in mind the idea that certain neural structures just are certain 
beliefs, Law insists that ultimately, given certain neural structures combined with 
certain desires, a subject’s faculties will likely produce a true belief that is 
necessary for survival and reproduction. Law formulates this objection into a 
scenario– let’s call it the wandering nomad objection.18 Law asserts the following:  
Consider a human residing in an arid environment. Suppose the only 
accessible water lies five miles to the south of him. Our human is desperately 
thirsty. My suggestion is that we can know a priori, just by reflecting on the matter, 
that if something is a belief that, solely in combination with a strong desire for 
water, typically results in such a human walking five miles to the south, then it is 
quite likely to be the belief that there’s water five miles to the south (or the belief 
that there’s reachable water thataway [pointing south] or whatever). It’s highly 
unlikely to be the belief that there isn’t any water five miles to the south (or isn’t 
any reachable water thataway), or the belief that there’s water five miles to the 
north (or thisaway [pointing north]), or the belief that there’s a mountain of dung 
                                                 
15 Alvin Plantinga. Warrant and Proper Function (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993), 225-
226. 
16 Is there any reason to believe that natural selection couldn’t have made it to where 
depression pumps adrenaline and not wanting to become dinner triggers laughter? I am not sure 
why natural selection couldn’t have gerrymandered differently, our emotions and desires, in regard 
to what biological reactions they trigger.  
17 Stephen Law has in mind demonstrating how given that beliefs just are neural structures, 
that combined with the right desires, natural selection would likely produce true beliefs. This is 
because the neural structures that are selected are selected in virtue of what behavior will likely 
produce. This leads him to argue that beliefs that enable survival and reproduction are likely true 
beliefs. The response that I will give can grant his assumption that neural structures just are beliefs 
and that those beliefs are selected because of their relation to the necessary behavior that needs to 
be displayed. 
18 Though Law has published recently on this topic, I have decided to use a slightly older copy 
of his work as it fits better with my purposes.  
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five miles to the south, or that inflation is high, or that Paris is the capital of 
Bolivia.19 
Is Plantinga's attempted defeater then deflected? In Naturalism Defeated: 
Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, Plantinga takes 
aim at the objection that a belief that enables survival likely correlates to true 
belief. Plantinga appears to raise a defeater deflector of his own by asserting that 
the answer is in gerrymandering the right properties. In what seems to be rarely 
responded to, Plantinga gives several examples of this. To Fales, Plantinga writes: 
Consider the cognitive agents who think everything is created by God and 
whose predicates express only properties entailing being created by God. 
Then, by the naturalist's lights, their beliefs will be mainly false. Still, their 
beliefs can obviously be adaptive, that is, lead to appropriate action; all that's 
required is that they ascribe the right properties to the right objects. Thus, 
for example, if they ascribe the property of being a tiger creature to tigers, 
and the property of being a dangerous creature to tiger creatures, they will 
presumably act in appropriate ways.20 
 
Plantinga’s point here is simple. For the naturalist, God doesn’t exist, however, if all 
of a subject’s beliefs are formed in such a way as to reflect the subject’s affirmation 
that God created ‘such and such,’ it would follow that all such beliefs would be false. 
In demonstrating this more clearly, Plantinga gives the example of a tribe who 
predicates the property of witch to everything21 – meaning that what really is a 
fierce and dangerous tiger is given the properties of dangerous, fierce, and witch. 
Let F be the property of fierce and let D be the property of dangerous. Say Paul is 
now in a tribe that perceives and believes all sorts of things have the property of 
witch. Paul falsely sees a witch that has the properties F and D. Paul now perceives 
imminent danger, which helps meet the conditions to get his adrenaline pumping so 
that he can flee. As long as the right properties are in place (F&D), there seems to 
be no reason why the remaining content has to be true. 
Perhaps one might reject this clarification, as though Paul may have one 
false belief, namely that something is a witch, he would still seem to have multiple 
true beliefs, namely something is F or something is D. In regard to predicating the 
property of witch to an appletree that is blooming, Jerry Fodor responds to 
Plantinga’s approach as he states: 
 
Still, much of what a creature believes in virtue of which it believes that that 
appletree witch is blooming (and in virtue of which the thought that that 
                                                 
19 Stephen Law. “Latest Version of EAAN Paper,” Accessed March 3rd, 2014. 
http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2010/11/latest-version-eaan-paper-for-comments.html   
20 Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism., edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 265. 
21 Ibid., 253. 
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apple tree witch is blooming leads to behavioral successes) are perfectly 
straightforwardly true. For example: that’s an appletree; that’s blooming; 
that’s there; something is blooming; something is blooming there, and so on 
indefinitely. The point is trivial enough: If a creature believes that appletree 
witch is blooming, then it presumably believes that that’s an appletree and 
that that’s a witch and that that’s blooming. And two of these are true beliefs 
that the creature shares with us and that enter into explanation of its 
behavioral successes vis-à-vis blooming appletrees in much of the same way 
that the corresponding beliefs of ours enter into the explanation of our 
behavior success vis-à-vis blooming appletrees.22 
 
What Fodor objects to is that even if one’s belief about a tiger includes it being 
created by God or one’s belief about an appletree includes it being a witch, one 
would still have all sorts of true beliefs as these belief would entail that one also 
believes that something is fierce and dangerous (in case of the tiger) or that 
something is juicy and life sustaining (in case of the witch).  
Plantinga responds to Fodor by stating the following: 
 
These creatures form beliefs only of the form ‘that P-witch has Q’ for 
properties P and Q. (We may add, if we like, that they form general beliefs of 
the form all (some) P-witches are Q, together with propositions appropriately 
constructible out of these general and singular beliefs.) So the creature in 
question doesn’t believe that’s an appletree (though he may believe that witch 
is an appletree) or that’s blooming (though he may believe that witch is 
blooming). Why couldn’t there be creatures like that? Not, surely (as Fodor 
himself notes, because any such creatures would have to believe all the 
logical consequences (for all the obvious logical consequences) of what he 
believes; we ourselves do not do that.23 
 
Plantinga’s argument comes down to the possibility that humans could have been 
constituted in such a way, where humans form beliefs in a phenomenologically 
simple way. It seems biologically possible that we could have evolved in such a way 
that we form beliefs without believing in any of the logical consequences that those 
beliefs would entail. Thus, to believe that witchtree is blooming, does not require 
one to believe that that’s a tree or that’s blooming. If this is possible, then it seems 
that one could form all sorts of different false beliefs that lead to survival and 
reproduction. If there are different beliefs that could be formed that would equally 
meet the Darwinian requirement, it would seem that one would have to remain 
                                                 
22 Jerry Fodor, “Is Science Biologically Possible?,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 34. 
23 Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism., edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 254. 
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inscrutable on the probability of R. This is so as one would lack a way to determine 
if their faculties produced beliefs that both meet the Darwinian requirement and 
reflect the external reality or if their beliefs just meet the Darwinian requirement. I 
will address this more in my own version of the argument. Now, having established 
the way in which Plantinga has responded to Fales and Fodor, I will apply his 
response to Law’s scenario. 
Instead of a man who needs to know the correct location of the water, let us 
change the content to needing a magical potion. Perhaps the nomad believes there 
was a demi-god who was jealous of humankind. Along with this, he believes that the 
demi-god cursed man and the creatures below man out of that jealousy. The curse 
now makes men's mouths shrivel up as the life is sucked slowly out of them. 
However, perhaps he also believes there is a good demi-god who countered this 
jealousy by giving man a special potion to sustain the life of man. The location of 
this magical potion is under the earth (where the demi-gods live of course) and can 
be seen in an abounding out flow from the earth. The nomad has several false 
beliefs (which for Law just are neural structures) in this revised scenario, but he is 
still being led by those false beliefs (for Law this would be different neural 
structures) to meet the Darwinian requirement.  
One may think that this nice story helps explain how one could have many 
false beliefs (or perhaps for Law, different neural structures), but it does not explain 
why the nomad forms what seem to be necessarily true beliefs as to the location of 
the magical potion or the need to have the potion for survival. Thus, like Fodor, Law 
could tell Plantinga that the nomad still has several true beliefs (for Law he would 
have the ‘right’ neural structures). The proponent of this argument could respond in 
two different ways. First, the advocate of the EAAN could argue that if all of the 
beliefs that the nomad formed are formed in such a way that they are affirmed 
without reflection of any logical consequence (see discussion with Fales), then the 
nomad would still have all or mostly all false beliefs. The nomad would believe that 
magical potion is over there, or I need that magical potion to survive. He wouldn’t 
need to believe in addition to those beliefs, that there was something over there or 
that I need something to survive.  
Secondly, she might argue that the proponent of the EAAN can concede that 
Law has demonstrated that there might be some true propositions that must be 
believed (perhaps certain neural structures are needed) in order to survive and 
reproduce, but besides those beliefs that must be believed all other sorts of 
important beliefs could be false. Perhaps she would focus on how metaphysical 
beliefs don’t secure such a tight connection to truth on N&E, and thus she would 
focus her attention on naturalism’s problem with metaphysical beliefs. 
It remains to be seen whether Plantinga's responses will be seen as cogent 
amongst the skeptics; I, however, would like to propose a new way of looking at 
Paul, the friendly homo sapien. Before looking at Paul again, I would like to take 
time to go through a brief overview of some evolutionary explanations for certain 
metaphysical beliefs. After surveying a few of these metaphysical views and their 
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relation to neo-Darwinian evolution, I will demonstrate how one might go about 
arguing for what I have suggested as the second response the proponent of the 
EAAN can give. 
 
NATURALISM AND ITS CURRENT ENDEAVOR IN METAPHYSICS 
 
I will now briefly discuss the different metaphysical beliefs that humans 
currently have that could have been a result of natural selection. By metaphysical 
belief(s), I mean a particular kind of proposition that is affirmed by a subject, that is 
often outside the spectrum of the empirical sciences and that is ultimately about 
what is real. On this subject, Paul Churchland asks and answers his own question, 
stating, 
Is our basic conception of human cognition and agency yet another myth, 
moderately useful in the past perhaps, yet false at its edge or core? Will a proper 
theory of brain function present a significantly different or incompatible portrait of 
human nature…I am inclined toward positive answers to all these questions.24 
One wonders if they should trust their basic human experience at all, as Daniel 
Dennett best puts it when he states, “The human mind is something of a bag of 
tricks, cobbled together over the eons by the foresightless process of evolution by 
natural selection.”25  
Attempts have been made to explain why the vast majority of the world’s 
population has religious belief. Several naturalists such as E.O. Wilson and Michael 
Ruse have argued that natural selection could have produced belief in God for 
survival.26 Kai Nielsen has continued this line of thinking by allowing for the 
possibility that personal dignity has a religious genesis.27 Daniel Dennett seems to 
follow this line of thinking as he has stated the notion of rights as being, “Nonsense 
on stilts.”28 
Of course, if human dignity did indeed have an evolutionary explanation, it 
would seem probable that ethics would as well. Mark Linville argues that if 
naturalistic Darwinian evolution were true, there would be Darwinian 
counterfactuals. That is, moral values and obligations could have been different, 
had the circumstances of evolution been different.29 Linville reflects on the world 
that Darwin had envisioned by quoting: 
                                                 
24 Paul Churchland. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into 
the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 19.  
25 Daniel Dennett.  Breaking the Spell: Religion As a Natural Phenomenon (N.Y.: Viking, 
2006), 107. 
26 Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism., edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 260.  
27 Kai Nielsen. Ethics Without God (London: Pemberton, 1973), 123-125. 
28 Daniel Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (N.Y.: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995), 507.  
29 Mark Linville, “The Moral Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 
edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 409. 
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Had the circumstances of human evolution been more like those of hive bees 
or Galapagos boobies or wolves, then the directives of conscience may have 
led us to judge and behave in ways that are quite foreign to our actual moral 
sense. Our wolfish philosophers defend justice as inequality, and their 
erudite reasonings take their cue from the fund of judgments bequeathed to 
them by their genes. Bees and boobies graced with intellect would judge that 
siblicide and infanticide are morally required under certain conditions.30  
 
In the same manner, Michael Ruse has stated, “Now you know that morality is an 
illusion put in place by your genes to make you a social cooperator.”31 
Like moral values and obligations, free will is another aspect that is often 
given a natural selection explanation. In reference to free will, Patricia Churchland 
has stated, “It’s like the illusion with morality. We know that moral laws are not 
specified by the gods. We know that they are, first of all, neurobiologically based or 
evolutionarily based, and, secondly, culturally based, but it’s very useful for people 
to have the illusion that these are really true.”32 One of the leading philosophers of 
mind, John Searle, admits that, “Our conception of physical reality simply does not 
allow for [libertarian] radical freedom.”33 Searle is not as certain with regard to why 
evolution would have given man the illusion of alternative possibilities, for he goes 
on to state, “For that reason, I believe, neither this discussion nor any other will 
ever convince us that our behavior is unfree.”34 
In continuing the tour of metaphysical proposals that have arrived in the 
form of biological adaption, Dennett suggests that the problem of how meaning 
could be determinate in a determined and Darwinian-fashioned universe, could be 
solved by denying any determinate meaning (a presupposition of reason) altogether. 
He states: 
 
Something has to give. Either you must abandon meaning rationalism – the 
idea that you are, unlike the fledgling cuckoo, not only having access, but in 
having privileged access to your meanings--or you must abandon the 
naturalism that insists that you are, after all, just a product of natural 
selection, whose intentionality is thus derivative and hence potentially 
indeterminate.35  
                                                 
30 Ibid., 409. 
31Michael Ruse. “God is Dead. Long Live Morality,” (accessed November 7, 2011) 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/15/morality-evolution-philosophy  
32 Patricia and Paul Churchland, “Patricia and Paul Churchland,” in Conversations on 
Consciousness: What the Best Minds Think About the Brain, Free Will, and What It Means to Be 
Human, edited by Susan Blackmore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 62. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
33 John Searle. Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 98. 
34 Ibid., 98. 
35Daniel Dennett. The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 313. 
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Lastly, I would like to point out that according to Plantinga, Michael Rea 
argues that materialism implies there are no real objects but that things are really 
propertied goo.36 It seems that regardless of Rea’s answer of why this is, it is 
possible that there are really no such things as objects (at least how we currently 
understand physical objections), but that perhaps our system developed in a special 
way where we perceive physical objects so that we could better organize our 
surroundings.  
 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON PAUL 
 
With a few examples of how the truth of certain metaphysical beliefs could be 
related to natural selection, I would like to take a new look at Paul. However, this 
time, instead of focusing on the causal relationship with the tiger, I would like to 
propose looking at Paul and his perspective of this sticky situation in which he has 
found himself. Paul again encounters the tiger; now, what false beliefs could be 
produced in the event that would lead to a Darwinian result? 
Paul lives in a world in which there are no objects – perhaps in reality 
following Michael Rea's line of thinking that there is only proportioned goo.37 It is 
here, however, that our minds have evolved in such a way as to perceive objects in 
order for survival.38 Paul finds himself eye-to-eye with a tiger and distressed about 
what he should do. He has a belief that his free will (though he is a determined 
being) has brought him here and his belief in free will brings some comfort as he 
goes up against the tiger. After thinking for a while, Paul decides it would be best if 
he were to scream for help just in case any nearby hunters are listening. Of course, 
his thoughts are indeterminate, just as a cuckoo bird’s thoughts would be, but 
luckily for Paul, he does not know that. Paul then makes a good conscious and 
logical reflection about his situation and the moral obligation he feels to run up 
against the tiger so that his large family, (which he has built up for religious 
reasons) may get away. Paul attacks the tiger in order that his offspring may live 
and reproduce. 
These beliefs would successfully deliver the correct Darwinian output, and 
yet these beliefs could have all been false. Thus, here is an example of how our 
cognitive faculties could be producing false metaphysical beliefs, but that even these 
false metaphysical beliefs could in fact be aiding survival. Natural selection could 
                                                 
 
36 Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” in Naturalism Defeated? Essays on 
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism., edited by James Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 261. 
  
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Perhaps even the metaphysical belief in other minds is really an illusion that natural 
selection has provided. Something like a Freudian theory could be true, in that in order to survive 
this cold and dark world, our mind has projected other minds to aid in our comforting. 
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have just as easily chosen different metaphysical views, as opposed to those we have 
now. Notice, I have not argued that natural selection did make it the case that we 
would believe in things like free will and moral obligations for the evolutionary 
reasons that were given. Nor have I claimed that the evolutionary explanations for 
the metaphysical beliefs that have been discussed above are orthodox views in the 
naturalist community. Rather, I am arguing that given N&E, these evolutionary 
explanations are just as likely as any other sort of explanation. This is because 
these beliefs (whether they are true of false) are such beliefs that would lead to the 
correct Darwinian result. 
 
NATURAL SELECTION, THEISM, AND NATURALISM 
 
Having established how different metaphysical views could aid in fulfilling 
the Darwinian requirement and yet not be true beliefs, I would like to specifically 
bring attention to the metaphysical beliefs in theism and naturalism. As mentioned 
above, there are certain evolutionary psychologists who affirm that our cognitive 
faculties produce belief in God as a means to achieve better survival. Perhaps 
believing in something like God is comforting, or perhaps a group believing in 
something higher than them, helps a group’s unity and community. Now, if people 
came to believe that God existed in such a way and this belief aided in the 
Darwinian requirement, this belief would seem to be a candidate for what our 
cognitive systems could have produced. 
This does not seem like the only candidate however, as perhaps naturalism 
could be a belief that natural selection could have given us as well. Under different 
circumstances, maybe humans who were inclined to have religious beliefs and form 
religious rituals in light of them, would have fought more against those in their own 
group for wanting to form different religious rituals. This might have brought 
division and if it would have continued, it would have continually decreased the 
population of a group. If a mutation began in some individuals (or perhaps some 
individuals never were naturally inclined to accept theistic belief) that led to them 
naturally believing in naturalism, it would have allowed the predisposed naturalist 
to have a better chance to meet the Darwinian requirement than the predisposed 
theist who were in continual schism.  
Thus, if both believing in theism and believing in naturalism are genuine 
possibilities that natural selection could have selected, it would appear that there 
would be no way to know which belief is true. Both of these beliefs could have aided 
in meeting the Darwinian requirement and both would recognize certain evidences 
as supporting their views. When the Darwinian requirement could be met by two 
different conflicting views, I fail to see how one could know if their cognitive 
faculties are aimed at producing true metaphysical beliefs or if one’s metaphysical 
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beliefs have been produced and kept merely for the purposes of meeting the 
Darwinian requirement.39 
 
XX Pills and Undercutting Defeaters 
 
Perhaps one may now be tempted to run to science and reason (S&R) and 
argue that the empirical sciences can come to the rescue. Maybe, left without S&R, 
we would just have to work from unreliable intuitions that have been hardwired to 
believe a certain way. But with S&R, one can verify in an objective way, how the 
world really is. We can then have tangible reasons for believing that free will is 
bunk or that there really are such things as objects. 
I think this sort of thinking however, misses the point entirely. On this view, 
humans would likely have beliefs about their justification which would stem from a 
particular framework that would be the result of natural selection. This framework 
would be made up of impulses, intuitions, background beliefs, and moral values, 
which would all be subjected to particular Darwinian factors that could have easily 
not have actualized under different circumstances. This framework would then be 
used to interpret and analyze all of the evidence for the rationality of theism. 
I think a clear example of this can be seen from the problem of evil. Thomas 
Crisp has argued that given unguided evolution, the chances of human beings 
having accurate high level metaphysical beliefs such as beliefs about justifying 
reasons for why God would permit evil, would be low.40 In addition to this, given 
that the moral Darwinian counterfactuals could have been different; would one 
really be in a position to judge objectively what is evil? As mentioned earlier, we 
could have evolved under different circumstances where all sorts of other actions 
could have been perceived as evil. Thus, even if one wanted to use reason (perhaps 
using the argument from evil) to see if one’s faculties were truth aimed in regard to 
their belief about theism, it would be impossible to use such means in a way that 
would bring about objective probability.  
This case would then seem similar to the man who takes the XX pill. This is 
the scenario where a man takes the XX pill, (which has a high chance of making 
one's cognitive faculties no longer reliable) and becomes convinced that he took the 
XX pill. Even if the man looked around and it appeared to him that nothing had 
changed, it wouldn’t appear that he would have warrant for his belief that R. This is 
so; even if it was the case that he did empirical experiments or used reason to try to 
prove that his cognitive faculties were in fact reliable. I think this is analogous to a 
subject who, when seeing there is reason to believe his cognitive faculties could have 
                                                 
39 In addition to these possibilities, perhaps given the right external factors, we could have 
been biologically constituted in such a way that we would naturally believe in god or gods, but then 
slowly loose that belief for belief in naturalism. Similarly, the opposite of this seems true as well. The 
point is, on N&E, there is no way of telling if a belief came about from faculties aimed at truth or if 
the belief is just accepted as the result of the fulfillment of the Darwinian requirement.  
40 Thomas Crisp, “An Evolutionary Argument from Evil,” in Evidence and Religious Belief, 
edited by Kelly James Clark and Raymond Van Arragon (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2011). 
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equally produced other conflicting beliefs, still tries to prove that those faculties are 
truth conducive. This is because his framework, in which he reasons from, is 
affected by Darwinian factors that could have easily been different. There could 
have been all sorts of different sets of impulses, intuitions, background beliefs, and 
moral values. He would lack reason to believe that his particular framework is a 
framework aimed at truth and is unaffected by the Darwinian dilemma. Thus, in 
both cases, there would be undercutting defeaters. 
 
THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT AGAINST METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS 
 
It is in virtue of this that I now propose a new argument within the family of 
Plantinga’s argument. Let N be naturalism and let E stand for evolution. 
 
(1) Given N&E, one’s metaphysical beliefs are produced from cognitive 
faculties that are not directly aimed towards producing true beliefs but 
are produced from faculties aimed at meeting the Darwinian requirement 
of survival and reproduction.  
(2) Given (1), all of our metaphysical beliefs are either the direct result of 
being produced to meet the Darwinian requirement or they are 
evolutionary by-products (spandrels) of beliefs that do. 
(3) Given (1) and (2), it seems possible that under different circumstances, 
our evolutionary makeup could have made it to where we would have 
believed different metaphysical beliefs.  
(4) (3) would include all metaphysical beliefs besides those metaphysical 
beliefs that would be required to be believed in order to meet the 
Darwinian requirement. 
(5) Given (3) and (4), if one’s cognitive system could have produced different 
metaphysical beliefs, and if upon reflection one lacked a reason for giving 
preference to certain metaphysical beliefs over others, one would lack a 
way of knowing which metaphysical beliefs were true. 
(6) If one lacked a way of knowing which metaphysical beliefs were true, then 
one would have a defeater for those metaphysical beliefs. 
(7) Naturalism is a metaphysical belief that given (5) and (6), one would lack 
a way of knowing if it were true. 
(8) Therefore, given N&E, one has a defeater for the belief in naturalism. 
 
It appears that (1) and (2) would be espoused by anyone who adheres to N&E; thus 
I suspect that these premises would not be controversial. However, the main thrust 
of the argument would be with regard to (3) and (7). If the above examples are 
suffice to demonstrate its plausibility, at least in showing that (3) and (7) are more 
plausible than their negation, then I think the argument is a good one and can 
contribute to the literature that pertains to the evolutionary argument against 
naturalism. 
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